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Handbook Updates
For those of you subscribing to
the Ag Decision Maker Hand-
book, the following updates are
included.
2003 Corn and Soybean
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Living with Hogs in Rural Iowa*
continued on page 2
Approximately 65,000 farmers raised hogs in Iowa in 1980with an average of 200 hogs residing on each farm. In 2002,the number of farms with hogs had fallen to about 10,000,
and the average number of hogs per farm had risen to over 1,400. In
the not-so-distant past, the presence of livestock on farms was the
social norm. When living or traveling in rural areas, you would
expect to smell the smells, hear the noises, and see the sights that
accompany such operations. Rural neighbors registered few com-
plaints when nearly everyone had livestock. But the dramatic
increase in the concentration of ownership now means that far
fewer rural residents have a large financial interest in livestock.
What once was the smell of money is now the smell of somebody
else’s money.
Complaints and lawsuits about
livestock operations are now
much more common. The best
known case involves the four
farm couples—two of which had
raised livestock—who sued Iowa
Select Farms in 2002 for the
production of offensive odors,
noxious gasses, and excessive
flies on the company’s 30,000
head hog facility in Sac County,
Iowa. The plaintiffs were
awarded $1.06 million in actual
damages plus $32 million in
punitive damages.
Lawsuits are a costly means of
settling disputes. But many
residents feel that they have no
alternative because state law
largely controls the siting of
livestock operations. Currently,
livestock producers have the
right to construct facilities that
meet state environmental
standards. Supporters of state
control argue that making Iowa a
location that consistently applies
standards for siting livestock
facilities makes economic sense
because livestock production is
one of the industries for which
Iowa has a competitive advan-
tage.
Inside . . .
* Reprinted with permission from the
Summer 2003 issue of the Iowa Ag
Review, Center for Agricultural and
Rural Developmenmt.
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Opponents of state control argue that increased
local control of livestock operations makes sense
because local governments are in a better position
to gauge the local costs and benefits of local
economic activities. Many feel, however, that, at
least for hogs, modern feedlots in Iowa offer few
local benefits. Sow facilities generate far more
economic activity than do finishing operations.
Increasingly, Iowa is becoming home to finishing
operations, while the large sow facilities are
locating in North Carolina, Missouri, and Canada.
And concentrated ownership of finishing opera-
tions means more central purchasing of feed,
veterinary services, and other supplies. Central
purchasing helps larger commercial centers but
not necessarily smaller communities.
Thus, the benefits associated with increased
economic activity from livestock production flow to
larger commercial areas, and to the state as a
whole, whereas the costs from odor, flies, and the
risk of water contamination are borne locally.
Clearly, under these circumstances, more local
control would mean more restrictions. The diffi-
cult question that Iowa must address is, “How can
a competitive livestock industry be supported
while accounting for local costs?”
Regulation through Assigned Property Rights
Suppose that a hog farmer wants to build three
new finishing houses on a site. The farmer knows
that the hogs will generate a significant amount of
odor intermittently throughout the year. This odor
will affect the residents of four nearby families.
Under current law, as long as all state environ-
mental requirements are met, the farmer can
build the facility. To some this means that current
state law assigns this hog farmer the right to
generate odor. But suppose state law gave the four
families the right to be free of odor?
Initially you might think that such a proposal
would bring a halt to any expansion in the hog
industry, as residents would veto any new con-
struction. But is this necessarily the case? A right
to be free of odor can be considered a property
right, in which the property is odor-free air rather
than real estate. Just as real estate can be traded,
so too could the right to odor-free air. Is it possible
that private negotiations between the hog farmer
and rural residents could result in a solution
where everybody is better off?
Suppose that at this location, the hog farmer
expects to generate profits equal to $10,000 per
year from the operation, after accounting for all
costs of building and operating the facility. A
payment to the residents of anything less than
$10,000 per year would leave this farmer better
off than if the project were blocked. Economists
call this $10,000 the farmer’s maximum willing-
ness to pay to be able to build this facility. Fur-
ther, suppose that each of the four families would
accept nothing less than $1,000 each per year as
compensation for having to breathe hog odors.
Economists call this $1,000 payment the mini-
mum willingness to accept the odor.
There is room for mutually beneficial trade when
the willingness to pay exceeds the willingness to
accept, as is the case in the example. Suppose the
hog farmer offered each family $1,500 per year as
compensation for the odor. The farmer’s profit
would decrease by $6,000 but would still be
positive. Each family would have $500 per year
over and above the actual amount of harm caused
by the odor.
Note also that giving families the right to be odor
free encourages the farmer to invest in cost-
effective practices that eliminate odor. Suppose
that an investment of $3,000 per year would
eliminate odor. The farmer would have an incen-
tive to make this investment because it would be
less than the $6,000 paid to the families as com-
pensation for the odor.
This beneficial solution follows from the assign-
ment of a property right to the rural residents.
But the property right also could be assigned to
the hog farmer. Suppose the hog farmer has the
right to generate odor. The farmer would have no
immediate incentive to compensate the odor-
affected families, but the families would have an
incentive to induce the farmer to adopt odor-
reducing technologies. If the odor generates
$4,000 in damages and costs $3,000 to eliminate,
then there is room for mutually beneficial trade to
take place. In this case the payments would go to
the farmer from the residents. Again, the assign-
ment of property rights is the key to reaching an
agreement.
continued on page 3
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The Magnitude of Damages
Is there room for beneficial trades that could help
solve the problem of locating livestock facilities in
Iowa? There is, unless the damages caused by
proximity to livestock operations are much greater
than the profits generated by such activity. How
can we measure such damages? There is no mar-
ket price for hog odor, so we cannot look at market
reports. Surveys that ask residents how much
they would be willing to pay to be free of hog odor
would be a poor basis on which to base damage
estimates. What is needed is a measure that is
based on actual transactions between individu-
als—such as residential real estate transactions.
If odor causes damage, then one would expect
that, all other things being equal, a house that is
exposed to odor would sell for less than a house
that is not. Therefore, measuring the impact of
odor on property values should yield the needed
damage estimates. We do not have a measure of
odor at each property. Instead, we created a proxy
measure of odor exposure by calculating the
number, distance, and direction of feedlots relative
to residential properties that have sold.
We obtained data for every rural residential house
sold in Webster, Humboldt, Hamilton, Franklin,
and Hardin counties from the mid-1990s until the
summer of 2002. Along with the actual sale price
for each home, we collected information on those
attributes that typically affect a home’s value,
such as the square feet of living space, number of
bedrooms, and proximity to schools and commer-
cial centers. Finally, we used Department of
Natural Resources data on the location and size of
livestock operations requiring either an operating
permit or a manure management plan to deter-
mine how close each home was to each of these
livestock facilities. For each house, we identified
the nearest livestock operation, recording the
operation’s distance from the house, its size (live
weight), and whether it was upwind of the home
during the winter (that is, northwest) or summer
(that is, south) seasons. We also computed the
number of operations within a three- and ten-mile
radius. We then determined (using regression
techniques) if there is a statistically significant
effect of proximity of livestock operations on
property values, and if so, the magnitude of the
effect. Only owner-occupied, single-family de-
tached residences were included in the study.
Details of the analysis are contained in CARD
Working Paper 03-WP 342 (available at
<http:\\www.card.iastate.edu>).
There is an important qualification to report
about the results of this study. The statistical
techniques used to estimate these results give
insights into the average effects, not the effects on
any particular residence. The actual affects will
be higher or lower, depending on the type of
facility, the type of livestock located in the facil-
ity, how well the facility is managed, topographi-
cal features of the site, and other factors that are
not explicitly included in our statistical analysis.
Results of CARD’s Analysis
Reasonable results emerge from our analysis.
Overall, the data suggest that livestock facilities
can affect property values. The closer the facility
is to a residence, the greater the effect. And the
effect is zero unless the residence is downwind of
the closest facility.
We can best illustrate the magnitude of the
effects by posing the following scenario. Suppose
a residence has a three-mile buffer zone with no
livestock facilities. Our results indicate that if one
facility with 450,000 lbs live weight of livestock
moved to within one-half mile, the value of the
residence would decline by an average of 8 per-
cent if the facility were located to the northwest
and by 5 percent if the facility were located to the
south. These declines in average property values
increase to 11 percent and 7 percent if the facility
were located within one-quarter mile. At a dis-
tance of 1.5 miles, the declines fall to 3 percent
and 2 percent.
The large amount of variation in the data ham-
pers our ability to measure precisely the effects of
livestock facilities on property values. However, it
is somewhat reassuring that our average results
are about the same as those of a previous study
conducted in North Carolina by Palmquist, Roka,
and Vukina (“Hog Operations, Environmental
Effects, and Residential Property Values,” Land
Economics, vol. 73, February 1997, pp. 114-124).
In this earlier study, the results indicated that
rural residential property values declined by as
much as 9 percent because of the siting of hog
facilities within one-half mile of a residence.
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by William Edward, extension economist, 515-294-6161, wedwards@iastate.ed and
Bob Wisner, extension economist, Department of Economics, 515-294-6310,
rwwisner@iastate.edu
Direct and Counter Cyclical Farm
Program Payments
continued on page 5
As farmers plan theircredit line activitiesfor the rest of the
year and beyond, they need
to factor in the direct and
counter cyclical program
payments that they can
expect to receive from the
USDA.
Direct Payments
Direct payments are fixed,
regardless of year-to-year
variations in acres, yields
and prices. Producers who
elected to receive the
maximum first-half pay-
ment for the 2003 crop
received a check a few
weeks after they completed
sign-up for the Farm Secu-
rity and Rural Investment
Act of 2002. An identical
A Possible Trade-off?
With these potential property damages in mind,
would a policy that gives existing homeowners the
right to be free of damage from livestock opera-
tions put a stop to all facility construction? Our
results suggest that there may be significant room
for beneficial trade between livestock farmers and
homeowners.
Suppose that a farmer wants to locate a site a half
mile upwind from two residences valued at
$100,000 each and that there are no other facili-
ties located in the area. The farmer is a good
neighbor and promises to manage the operation to
minimize odor, flies, and the risk of a manure
spill. But the realties of livestock production in
this case impinge on the owners of the residences.
Given the right to be free of any effect from live-
stock operations, the homeowners would be able to
block construction of the facility. But suppose the
farmer offers each homeowner a one-time pay-
ment of $10,000 (10 percent of the value of the
home) as compensation for any potential damages.
The homeowners might well choose to take the
money and live with the livestock. The farmer
would then be able to construct the facility at the
chosen site, at a modest increase in construction
costs. And the state of Iowa would get the benefits
of attracting a competitive industry.
Exact rules and legal obligations would have to be
worked out before any compensation program
could be implemented. However, given the current
stalemate, whereby homeowners feel powerless to
affect land use decisions and livestock producers
feel that their investments are not welcome in the
state, the payoff from such voluntary agreements
could be large.
Table 1. Estimated National Average Corn and Soybean Prices
(Sept. - July).
Corn Soybeans
Est. % Est. %
Month Price Marketed Price Marketed
September $2.47 8% $5.39 8.5%
October 2.34 11 5.19 20.9
November 2.27 12.7 5.46 9.4
December 2.32 7 5.46 8.1
January 2.33 12.5 5.52 15.5
February 2.34 6 5.55 6.6
March 2.33 6.2 5.60 8
April 2.34 6 5.82 5.1
May 2.38 6.3 6.07 4.2
June 2.34 7.5 6.09 4.6
July 2.09 8.8 5.84 5.1
August 8 4
Simple Avg. Price* $2.35 $5.62
Est. Weighted Ave. Price* 2.32 5.52
Est. Percent Marketed* 92% 96%
*Approximate simple and weighted national average prices and percent marketed
(Sept. through July)
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amount is scheduled to be paid in October, as the
second half of the 2003 crop direct payment.
Furthermore, the first installment of the 2004 crop
direct payment will be received in December, again
for the same dollars as the 2003 payments.
Counter Cyclical Payments
Counter cyclical payments (CCP) are less predict-
able. They depend on the national season average
price for each crop. For corn and soybeans this
price is the weighted average cash price paid from
September through August. Soybean prices for the
2002 crop have been high enough that there will be
no counter cyclical payment made. It is possible
but not likely that there will be a small payment
for corn.
Monthly corn and soybean prices, along with
estimates of the percentage of the crop that
is marketed each month, is presented in
Table. 1. Estimates of the simple average
and monthly average prices so far this year
are shown at the bottom.
For the 2002 corn and soybean crops, USDA
price projections through July 2003 indicate
that marketing year average prices will be
above the level that will generate CCPs as
shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Possible CCPs for 2002 Crop Corn and Soybean
Corn Soybean
Breakeven Price $2.32 $5.36
Simple Avg. Price* 2.35 5.62
Possible CCP 0 0
Est. Weighted Avg. Pr.* 2.32 5.52
Possible CCP 0 0
*Approximate simple and weighted national average prices (Sept. through
July)
Direct and Counter Cyclical Farm Program Payments, continued from page 3
by Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
professor of Economics
Cash Renting After Death: A Problem for
Installment Payment of Federal Estate Tax? *
Ordinarily, land that is cash rented afterdeath which is subject to an election topay federal estate tax in installments is
considered “distributed, sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of” and the deferred tax is
accelerated if the value of assets involved (plus
all previous distributions, sales or disposition of
assets after death) equals 50 percent or more of
the date-of-death value of the interest in a
closely-held business which qualified for install-
ment payment. However, a recent private letter
ruling has allowed cash renting of farmland after
death without acceleration being triggered.
General rule on cash renting
The rule is well established that assets which are
cash rented after death cease to be an “interest in a
closely-held business” which is necessary in order
to maintain continuing eligibility for installment
payment of federal estate tax and to avoid accel-
eration. Indeed, a 1983 private letter ruling specifi-
cally so held. It has generally been thought that, to
avoid acceleration, it was necessary for the lessor
of the asset or assets to be bearing the risks of
* Reprinted with permission from the June 19, 2003 issue of
Agricultural Law Digest, Agricultural Law press publications,
Eugene, Oregon. Footnotes not included.
If the USDA projects a season average market
price below $2.32 for corn or below $5.36 for soy-
beans for next year’s (2003) crop, an advance
counter-cyclical payment may be made. Up to 35
percent of the expected counter-cyclical payments
will be paid in October and again in February, with
the balance payable next September.
Loan Deficiency Payments
Loan deficiency payments were not available for
the 2002 crop. It remains to be seen if they will be
available for the 2003 crop. Any time that the
posted county price  in a county is below the county
loan rate, a loan deficiency payment or marketing
loan can be requested on bushels that have been
harvested but not sold.
Permission to copy
Permission is given to reprint ISU Extension
materials contained in this publication via copy
machine or other copy technology, so long as the
source (Ag Decision Maker Iowa State
University Extension ) is clearly identifiable
and the appropriate author is properly credited.
Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 14th
and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410
or call 202-720-5964.
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts of
May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Stanley R. Johnson, director,
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University of
Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa.
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. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status.
(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
materials can be made available in alternative formats for ADA
clients. To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA,
production and the risks of price change with
evidence that there was some involvement in
management, albeit short of material participa-
tion.
The 2003 Ruling
In Ltr. Rul. 200321006, the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that a cash rent lease did not accel-
erate the deferred tax or count against the 50
percent that would lead to acceleration. In the
facts of that ruling, a farmer who had been operat-
ing as a sole proprietorship and who had been
actively involved in farming operations until the
date of death, left a will leaving a majority of the
decedent’s assets to a residuary trust with three
primary beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were two
sons and a third individual (unrelated) who had
been raised by the decedent. The decedent’s will
authorized the trust to lease portions of the land
to the trust beneficiaries provided the beneficia-
ries were to operate the farm personally. The will
further provided that, in the event the trust
beneficiaries (individually or in combination) were
the sole owners of the farming entity, a lease to
the entity was authorized. Accordingly, the trust
entered into cash rent leases with limited liability
companies set up specifically by two of the benefi-
ciaries.
Ordinarily, such post-death cash rent leases have
been the occasion for acceleration of federal estate
tax. However, in this instance the limited liability
companies had single owners and, therefore, were
considered disregarded entities. As a result, the
rental arrangement was considered a lease di-
rectly to the respective heir and did not result in
acceleration. The arrangement was viewed as not
materially altering the business.
The ruling cites to Rev. Rul. 66-62 as authority.
That ruling involved the change from a corpora-
tion to an unincorporated form with IRS holding
that the transformation did not materially alter
the business.
Lease by Residuary Trust
The interesting question is why the ruling did not
discuss the fact situation as involving a cash rent
lease by the residuary trust. The rule is well
established that a cash rent lease, even to a family
member of the decedent, fails the test of being a
business. Thus, a cash rent lease directly to a
family member as heir would ordinarily be ex-
pected to trigger acceleration. That literally is the
result of the characterization of the arrangement
as a cash rent lease to a disregarded LLC.
The important point is that it is the lessor who is
expected to maintain the assets involved as a
business. As the lessor, the residuary trust seem-
ingly failed to meet that requirement.
There has been an exception, at least in the pre-
death qualification period, for trusts that were
grantor trusts which was not the case in the 2003
letter ruling. Obviously, a residuary trust is not a
grantor trust. It is noted that the residuary trust
in question had three beneficiaries, only one of
which was the lessee. Thus, it would appear that
the trust was no longer meeting the “business”
requirement in the period during which accelera-
tion could occur.
In Conclusion
Care is needed for all post-death leasing, entity
transformations or other distributions, sales or
dispositions. The latest ruling should be used
carefully as authority. It provides only limited
authority for post-death cash rent leasing of
assets subject to an election to pay federal estate
tax in installments. The safe approach is to assure
that the post-death owner of the assets, including
a trust, meets a “business” test during the entire
period during which acceleration could occur.
